A Thomistic Theological Anthropology of Loneliness and Belongingness

Samuel Norman

University of St Andrews

Introduction

The following paper offers a Thomistic theological anthropology of loneliness and belongingness. First, it interprets loneliness and belongingness as species of sorrow and joy within Aquinas’ theological anthropology: passions arising from a perceived privation or possession of relational goods. It examines how the phenomenological character of these passions can produce a disjunction between a person’s judgment, their actual condition, and the kinds of goods truly proportionate to their nature. Second, this paper explores the effects of loneliness and belongingness, highlighting the aggravating factors that can cause benign episodes of loneliness to develop into more serious psychological conditions. Third, this paper forms an account of the types of relationships human beings are made for through Aquinas’ account of friendship. Finally, it concludes by considering the implications of this theological anthropology for addressing issues of loneliness and belongingness.

Loneliness and Belongingness as Passions of the Soul

            There are two ways a person can apprehend an object that results in pleasure or pain. The first is apprehension through an exterior sense.[vi] This is where an individual, in reaction to direct stimuli, considers an object in the present to be good or evil in relation to their being. Pleasure and pain caused by exterior apprehension are merely called pleasure and pain.[vii] The second way one experiences pleasure and pain is through an interior apprehension of the intellect or imagination. This is where an individual, via their intellect or imagination, considers an object which is not necessarily present, either in the past, present, or future, to be good or evil in relation to their nature.[viii] Pleasure and pain, in this instance, are called joy or sorrow.[ix] It is only this latter interior apprehension that makes sense of why human beings can have pleasure or pain in objects that are not present to the exterior senses.

            While loneliness and belongingness are concepts that are not directly addressed by Aquinas, there are strong reasons to identify them as true species of sorrow and joy within his anthropological framework due to their coherence with their modern scientific notion.[x] Both the modern psychological conception of loneliness and Aquinas’ notion of sorrow entail some negative psychological manifestation or distressing feeling,[xi] and a perceptual element, whereby a person compares one’s present participation in certain goods and the measure of participation one judges as fitting for themselves.[xii] What separates loneliness from sorrow more generally is that loneliness specifies the particular goods that a person perceives as lacking. In modern scholarship, the goods that are lacking are framed in terms of social relationships and connections. Thus, loneliness (on a Thomistic reading) is sorrow caused by the perceived lack of relational goods.[xiii]

            Further, the modern idea of “belongingness”, or a person’s sense of belonging, shares identical features with Aquinas’ account of joy. Both concepts involve a positive psychological manifestation or feeling,[xiv] that arises from a person’s subjective perception of the value and fit of particular goods they are related to. Belongingness is a true species of joy, since it arises when particular relational or social goods are perceived as being conjoined to the person. In scientific literature, these goods are often identified as reciprocal relationships,[xv] arising from a person’s interaction with “social structures, norms, contexts, and experiences”.[xvi] Therefore, belongingness (on a Thomistic reading) is joy caused by the perceived conjunction to relational goods.

            It is important to note that, on this framework, a person can feel both loneliness and belongingness in relation to different objects.[xvii] For instance, a child may feel lonely regarding their connection to school friends and yet feel a sense of belonging among their family. However, for Aquinas, it is impossible that a person simultaneously pursue and avoid the same thing, and so someone cannot feel loneliness and belongingness in relation to the same good under consideration. The child cannot feel a sense of belonging in a particular friendship at school and feel a sense of loneliness because of that same friendship – it can only evoke one feeling or the other at the same time.

            In summary, on this Thomistic reading, loneliness is a species of sorrow – and internal passion – that arises when a person perceives (rightly or wrongly) a privation of relational goods considered proportionate to their human nature, as previously conceived by their imagination and reason. Belonging is the corresponding species of joy – an interior passion – that arises when a person apprehends a participation in the relational goods they consider proportionate to their human nature according to the workings of the imagination and reason. In both cases, a person’s passion follows their apprehension rather than what might be the objective situation. Consequently, it is possible that a person wrongly judges what goods are appropriate to their nature or wrongly apprehends their connection to particular relational goods.  

Experiences of Loneliness and Belongingness           

Therefore, loneliness’s proper object is a person’s own evil of penalty, which refers to the withdrawal of the due form and integrity of a thing. The evil of penalty is, by its very nature, contrary to the will, for the will’s object is the good, whereas penalty is the very privation of that good which the will seeks.[xx] While “evil of penalty” might evoke images of some punishment inflicted for an action a person has themselves committed, this is not necessarily the case within Aquinas’ framework. This can be illustrated by the case of a married man who commits adultery. In committing this act, he performs an operation contrary to the good of the marital relation. Upon reflection, he may recognise that his action was a failure to use the will to assent to what is good. What he may experience in this case is contrition resulting from a recognition of this moral fault: the privation of due operation in relation to the marital relationship with his wife. However, he may also feel loneliness on account of the effects of his actions in causing a rupture of the marriage’s integrity. Therefore, the man experiences contrition, in being sorrowful of the evil of fault (the adulterous act), and loneliness on account of being sorrowful for experiencing the evil of penalty (loss of relational integrity). The wife, by contrast, suffers the evil of penalty without being the cause. When confronted with the reality of her husband’s actions, she may experience a loss of trust, intimacy, and security that belonged to the integrity of the marital relationship. The integrity of the marriage has, at least in part, been dissolved due to the privation of these marital goods. Her loneliness has as its object the evil of penalty, whereby she experiences the loss of integrity in the relational good she participated in. This example shows that loneliness can arise either through one’s own actions or by the actions of another. The privation of relational integrity is not necessarily related to the actions of the person experiencing the loneliness. A person who is bereaved of their spouse through illness or one excluded from society because of unjust or disordered social structures is not in that position through their own volition. And so, the object of loneliness is one’s own evil as penalty, when one experiences the privation of some relational good, whether that results from one’s own actions or another’s.

Experiences of loneliness and belongingness can have different effects on a person depending on aggravating factors. The proper effect of sorrow for Aquinas is the “flight of the appetite” from evil.[xxi] Accordingly, loneliness, as a species of sorrow, includes the flight of the appetite with respect to relational goods as the person seeks to escape the privation of particular relational goods, such as adequate social relationships and connections. For instance, a person arrives home only to find out that their partner has gone out to the shops. Feelings of loneliness may arise from a desire for social connection that they do not currently have, which may, in turn, lead that person to seek out relational connection, which might take the form of calling a friend, going out to a neighbour’s house, or meeting their partner at the shops. This might be called episodic loneliness: where a person lacks some social good that is readily remedied.

            However, it is possible for the “flight” element of the effect to be hindered. For example, a person who experiences feelings of loneliness at work (where obligations hinder them from finding social connection) or on a journey (where physical location prevents a person from seeking relational goods) desires particular relational goods, but their circumstance prevents being joined to those goods immediately. Such situations cause a person anxiety caused by the unease of the situation in which they find themselves. One might call this anxious loneliness.[xxii]

            Further, a person might lack both the ability to escape their present social situation and cannot see how they might escape it. Take a retiree who lives alone in a rural area with no close family or friends and limited transportation. Consider a scenario in which they desire a meaningful friendship, but they perceive their situation as preventing them from building such a social connection. This person both lacks the ability to seek out a family member or friend, whereby they can experience friendship, and cannot see a way out of their current predicament. This also happens when anxiety plays on the mind so much that it clouds one’s ability to see a way out. This leads to a sharpened form of distress called perplexity. This might be labelled as perplexing loneliness.[xxiii]

 It is also worth noting what Aquinas calls depressing sorrow. This is where the present evil depresses a person to the extent that it hinders them from enjoying what would ordinarily be enjoyed. One can be in a “weak” depression, whereby the evil is not so strong as to strip a person of the hope of being rid of it, and thus the person retains an intrinsic motivation to avoid that evil. However, in a “strong” depression, the evil perceived is so strong that it takes away all hope. In this situation, a person’s motivation to avoid evil is completely hindered. Aquinas notes that in such a situation, the external movements of the body may become paralysed.[xxv] Since depression can be caused by sorrow, it is important to note that loneliness, as a species of sorrow, can also cause such a state. The “weak” depression belongs to perplexing loneliness, while the “strong” depression belongs to torporial loneliness.

Belongingness’s effects, as a species of joy, are intricately connected to joy’s general effects. For Aquinas, joy is pleasure (or delight) that occurs when a desire, cultivated by reason, is attained.[xxvi] Joy differs from mere pleasure since it requires action on the part of the intellect, whereas pleasure can be experienced in the body apart from the intellectual faculties.[xxvii] The effects of joy are: gladness, whereby a person’s apprehension of a thing expands by the pleasure of that thing and their appetitive power acquiesces to the pleasurable thing so that the person surrenders and clings to that object more firmly;[xxviii] exaltation, which is an exterior sign of delight;[xxix] and cheerfulness, as the outward signs and effects of inner gladness (often upon a person’s actions).[xxx] Thus, the effects of belongingness are gladness, exaltation, and cheerfulness in response to relational goods desired according to reason that are subsequently attained.

Further, belongingness, as something pleasurable, can cause a person to avoid circumstances that are detrimental to themselves and increase their association with activities appropriate to their good. This happens in two ways. First, it transpires when pleasure happens because of particular activities, as its end. For example, a person who seeks out a friend benefits from the pleasure of good company, and thus allows a person to rest content in that action. Second, pleasure strengthens a person’s future actions, since someone who takes pleasure in their actions becomes more “eagerly intent on it, and carries it out with greater care”.[xxxi] And so, while loneliness can reduce a person’s adherence to good action in certain circumstances, belongingness can increase a person’s adherence to social goods.

In summary, the effects of loneliness and belongingness neatly follow the effects of sorrow and joy. Loneliness, as a species of sorrow, has the proper object of one’s own evil in connection to relational goods. Its primary effect is the flight of the appetite from that evil. However, aggravating factors yields a gradation of effects depending upon the circumstances: episodic loneliness (no additional factors, easily remedied), anxious loneliness (flight is temporarily blocked, but a way out is seen), perplexing loneliness (when both flight is blocked an no way out is seen), and torporial loneliness (where the mind is so heavily burdened by the evil that it slows or stops physical movement towards relational good). Additionally, a person can experience depression amidst loneliness, the weaker form of which burdens a person but leaves hope and movement intact, aligning with perplexity; while the stronger form extinguishes hope and prevents outward activity, aligning with torpor. By contrast, belongingness is a species of joy, a type of pleasure that arises from the fulfilment of desires considered good by a person’s imagination and reason. The effects of belongingness are gladness, exaltation, and cheerfulness. Belongingness also increases a person’s adherence to relational goods.

All of this has wide-ranging implications for how one approaches solutions to loneliness and encourages belongingness. But it also brings into focus a crucial question: what are the relational goods that human beings are meant to participate in? For Aquinas, this question cannot be answered apart from the types and kinds of relationships that human beings are created for, and nowhere is this clearer than in his account of friendship.

Friendship as a Model for Ideal Human Relations

“Not every love”, Aquinas notes, “has the character of friendship”. For instance, a person can be said to love wine or a particular type of food, but such love does not have the character of friendship, since one is merely wishing the good of that thing for oneself, rather than wishing that thing good. However, merely wishing a person good is not sufficient for friendship, since it requires a mutual love between two people. But even two people wishing each other good does not suffice for friendship, for there must be some communication between them through which they can communicate their well-wishing. Thus, for Aquinas, friendship is distinguished from other forms of love by its reciprocity and shared communication of goodwill.

One can differentiate friendship in two ways: in its end and its kinds of communion. Regarding its end, he notes that friendship can be based upon (1) usefulness, whereby the persons in the relationship gain mutual benefit; (2) delight, where the friendship causes the persons pleasure because of their company, or (3) virtue, or charity, when a person loves another for God’s sake, thus founding friendship on the good of the other rather than themselves.[xxxii] For Aquinas, it is this latter that is the true form of friendship, and while friendship of utility and pleasure does wish another person good in some way,[xxxiii] it is itself deficient because it is ultimately referred to the person’s own good, rather than that of the other with whom they are in a friendship. He goes as far as to state that it is only a friendship of virtue that is called so essentially, while friendships of utility and pleasure are merely called so incidentally,[xxxiv] so that such relationships are friendships of resemblance “to the extent that they resemble the good”.[xxxv]

            This extends to the way one treats the acts associated with friendship. For Aquinas, true friendship is ultimately subsumed under the definition of charity, which Aquinas defines as the “friendship of man for God”.[xxxvi] In friendship of virtue, a person “reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend’s will is his own”,[xxxvii] so much so that it is as if whatever affects his friend affects himself.[xxxviii] This manifests itself in several virtuous acts, such as assistance in both spiritual and earthly duties,[xxxix] sharing of secrets,[xl] sharing of belongings,[xli] the removal of offence,[xlii] delight in another’s presence and their words and deeds,[xliii] as well as consolation and comfort in times of sorrow.[xliv] In a friendship of virtue, these acts are neither sought from the other as an end nor performed for the sake of reciprocity, but rather arise from each person mutually willing the other’s good. By contrast, in friendships of utility and pleasure, it is the benefit of the act itself which is sought. While these incidental friendships may imitate certain virtuous acts, they remain deficient, since their acts are pursued as ends in themselves rather than being expressions of the good simpliciter that characterises virtuous friendships. Consequently, while friendship can be differentiated according to its end, only friendship founded upon virtue can be considered true friendship.

            A second way one can differentiate species of friendship is by considering the various contexts within which it can arise. For Aquinas, following Aristotle, all friendship involves some common participation,[xlv] and thus differs according to the different modes of association.[xlvi] While an extensive analysis of every possible type of friendship is not possible here, for this paper, it is worth touching on the following: (1) familial, (2) companionate, (3) civic, and (4) spiritual friendship.

            Familial friendships are with immediate and extended relatives who share a common origin.[xlvii] Relationships of this kind are both prior to and are considered generally more stable than other unions. Aquinas reasons that while other relationships may come and go, familial relations are bound by something that affects our very substance.[xlviii] Further, he argues that since we can love in more ways those who are more closely connected to us, we “ought to love more specially those who are united to us by ties of blood”,[xlix] and that “in matters pertaining to nature we should love our kindred most”.[l]

            There are various kinds of familial relations. First, there is the friendship between a man and his wife. This is considered a “natural friendship” since the relationship is derivative of humans being politically oriented.[li] A political society belongs and depends upon the domestic familial life, of which the union of a man and wife is a part. This is because, by necessity, society needs such unions and friendships for the generation and nourishment of children. And so, if human beings are political animals, they are necessarily oriented towards being conjugal animals.[lii] However, the friendship between a man and his wife also functions as a unit for human living. Familial life brings responsibilities, which a man and wife will divide between them to aid each other in domestic life, and in providing these services for one another, they each contribute to the common good of the family.[liii] The unique elements of conjugal friendship, then, can be a friendship of utility, insofar as it supports family life, and can be a friendship of pleasure through the generative act. But it can also be a friendship of virtue when the husband and wife will the others good, with the result that such a friendship will be considered delightful to them both.[liv]

            A second familial friendship is that which exists between parent and child. Parents love their children as if they were a part of themselves, and so the love of one’s children is said to be closest to the love of oneself.[lv] On the other hand, Children love their parents, not as if they were a part of them, but as begotten by them.[lvi] The paternal friendship that exists between a parent and child is akin to a person’s relation to some superior good in which they can participate. This is because children are dependent upon their parents for their existence, upbringing, and training, with the parents being the cause of these goods.[lvii] Aquinas notes that such friendships have greater pleasure and utility than outside friendships, since a parent and child live lives more in common.[lviii] And when children show their parents due honour for their creation and upbringing, and the parents give to their children what is due to them, there will then exist between them “a lasting and just or virtuous friendship”.[lix]

            A third friendship that belongs to familial relations is that between siblings. Such friendships are unique since siblings, by being born to the same parents, share certain features of their parents in common.[lx] While some might regard similarities among siblings as a source of rivalry or tension, such shared features also ground a deeper commonality, fostering greater participation in one another’s lives and a stronger potential for friendship. Additionally, siblings share a similarity in their upbringing, which can foster a greater mutual love between them.[lxi] While features of sibling friendship are also found in non-familial friendships, if the sibling friendship is one of virtue with their habits being entirely alike, then such sibling friendships will be greater than non-sibling ones.[lxii] There are, of course, other familial relations, such as nephew/niece-uncle/aunt, grandparent-grandchild, and cousins, which space does not allow comment here. However, it will suffice to say that these friendships can feature some of the goods that exist in parent-child relations, insofar as the grandparents and uncles have a role in the upbringing and training of the child, while cousin friendships can experience some of the goods of sibling friendship, to the extent that some cousins will share features of their grandparents and may have similar upbringings.

            Companionate friendship is that which exists between those who lack a direct familial relation yet share a common upbringing. As a result, friendship between comrades can exhibit many of the features that are included in sibling friendship, including a mutual love founded upon identical features in their manner of life.[lxiii] While virtuous friendships between siblings are generally strong for the reasons outlined above,[lxiv] virtuous companionate friendships can be greater if one lacks virtuous sibling friendships or if one has more habits that align with their comrade than their siblings.[lxv] For this reason, the status of a companionate friendship is considered higher than that of one’s relation to a fellow citizen.[lxvi]

            Civic friendship involves individuals who share in a common civic duty, for example, fellow soldiers, students, or even those of the same citizenship.[lxvii] Such friendships have more obvious and observable signs of association than those of familial or companionate friendships. Whereas family or comrades share in a common origin or upbringing, civic friendships are based upon current and observable occupations and associations.[lxviii] At their best, virtuous civic friendships involve the pursuit of a common good or goal: a soldier in an army striving for victory, students among classmates seeking the attainment of truth and understanding, or fellow citizens working towards the happiness of their community.[lxix]

            Finally, one can have spiritual friendship. Human beings are created as such that they have a spiritual life, whereby a person can have friendship with God, which is also called charity.[lxx] For Aquinas, a person’s friendship with God is like a child’s friendship with their parents. As noted above, a child has friendship with their parents to the extent that they are a kind of superior good, the parents being the cause of their existence, upbringing and training. Similarly, a person can have a friendship with God as their ultimate good, being the cause of their existence and perfection.[lxxi] However, human beings by themselves cannot aim towards the ultimate good and its associated activities and thus cannot attain friendship with God naturally.[lxxii] This is because our senses tend to focus on what is good according to them, rather than aiming at the Divine good, which is the object of charity and friendship with God. Attaining this friendship requires an act of grace that can allow our intellect to assent to the Divine good. This occurs in and through the Holy Spirit, “Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the participation of Whom in us is created charity”.[lxxiii] Thus, the Holy Spirit is the origin of friendship with God, through whom we have mutual communion and love with one another.[lxxiv] While this friendship is imperfect now, it will be perfect after our death and in the resurrection.[lxxv]

Divine friendship is a vital prerequisite for all kinds of virtuous friendships mentioned above. Friendships of utility and pleasure focus on the good that can be apprehended by the senses and thus can be had by anyone regardless of their relation to God. However, a friendship of virtue or charity, as noted above, is when a person loves another for God’s sake, and so does not have as its object our subjective sensory apprehensions, but rather the Divine good. As Aquinas states, love of charity “tends to God as to the principle of happiness, on the fellowship of which the friendship of charity is based”.[lxxvi] Thus, for a person to have true friendship with either family, comrades, or their fellow citizens requires first having a spiritual relationship with God, through which they can establish friendships with others that consider the good of the person for God’s sake rather than friendships established upon selfish benefit.

In summary, Aquinas situates friendship as a form of love between two people, which is mutual, communicated, and oriented towards the good of the other. True friendship is not grounded in utility or pleasure, but rather in virtue or charity – willing the good of the other for God. This purest form of friendship is only made possible through spiritual friendship with God, which in turn enables the perfection of all other forms of friendship – be that familial, companionate, or civic – by ordering them to the divine good. Each form of friendship represents a distinct way of participating in the good of the other: be that through shared origin, shared life, shared action or shared participation in God. However, such relational goods only find their perfection in virtuous friendships, whereby God properly orders the relationship towards the person’s good. Thus, while friendships of utility and pleasure can mimic virtuous friendship, they ultimately fall short of it since they are based upon purely utilitarian or hedonistic principles. It is only through participation in Divine friendship that the conditions of love are established through which all human relationships find their perfection.

Conclusion

An exploration of a Thomistic ontological account of loneliness and belongingness has uncovered several important points. Conceptually, loneliness is a species of sorrow that arises when a person perceives a privation of relational goods considered proportionate to their human nature as previously conceived by their imagination and reason. Belongingness is the corresponding species that arises when a person apprehends a participation in the relational goods they consider proportionate to their human nature according to the workings of the imagination and reason. There are different forms of loneliness according to the additional aggravating factors: episodic loneliness (no additional factors, easily remedied), anxious loneliness (flight is temporarily blocked, but a way out is seen), perplexing loneliness (when both flight is blocked an no way out is seen), and torporial loneliness (where the mind is so heavily burdened by the evil that it slows or stops physical movement towards relational good). Additionally, a person can experience depression amidst loneliness, the weaker form of which burdens a person but leaves hope and movement intact, aligning with perplexity; while the stronger form extinguishes hope and prevents outward activity, aligning with torpor. The effects of belongingness are more straightforward: gladness, exaltation, and cheerfulness, accompanied by a stronger adherence to such relational goods.

            This paper then went on to examine the relational goods that human beings have by examining Aquinas’ account of friendship. It was established that friendship can be broken down by end or by kind. By end, a person can have a friendship of utility (a mutual exchange of some useful good), a friendship of delight (a mutual cause of delight in each other’s company), or a friendship of virtue (when a person loves another for God’s sake). By kind, a person can have various types of familial, companionate, civic, and spiritual friendships. A person can have friendships of utility, pleasure, or virtue in each of these relationships – the exception being spiritual friendship, which by its very nature is virtuous. Further, it was found that a person cannot have a virtuous friendship with any person before establishing spiritual friendship with God, who is the foundation of all virtuous relationships. Consequently, persons devoid of spiritual friendship with God can only form friendships of utility and pleasure. They cannot form virtuous friendships in any relationship, lacking the conditions necessary to access the ultimate relational goods available to human beings.

Implications of Research

Psychological nature of loneliness and belongingness. The first implication of this research paper is that loneliness and belongingness are passions that are based on a person’s perception of the relational goods they should have compared with what they perceive to be their adherence to those relational goods presently. Thus, one problem is that individuals can expect more or less from a friendship than is appropriate to that relationship or may be deluded that they have particular relational goods which are not in fact present.

Gradation of loneliness. A second implication is that loneliness, as a species of sorrow, can manifest in various ways depending on additional aggravating factors. While episodic loneliness is a common feeling that motivates movement towards relational goods, loneliness can be the cause of anxiety, perplexity, torpor, and depression, depending upon one’s circumstances and psychological state. Addressing these types of loneliness may require a variety of solutions and approaches that engage with both a person’s perception of relational goods and their ability to access such goods.

The problem of expectations. At the heart of loneliness is a person’s perception of the relational goods one should have compared with what they currently receive. Thus, addressing loneliness requires addressing the subjective perception of these goods in some way. One approach to address loneliness might be through some form of expectation management – that is, attempting to reduce a person’s expectations of the relationships that are good for their nature, for example, to minimal levels of friendship through utility. Doing so would inevitably reduce loneliness, at least in the short term, since the gap between expected relational goods and received relational goods would reduce. Additionally, highlighting minimal expectations for one’s relationships may also increase feelings of belongingness since they will be at the forefront of one’s mind. However, even if this reduces feelings of loneliness and increases belongingness, this approach will increase the existential dissatisfaction or metaphysical restlessness – a sense that human nature is made for more than relationships of utility or pleasure, that human beings are ordered toward a higher form of communion than relationships of utility and pleasure can provide. Thus, while reducing expectations may temper reported loneliness, it sacrifices determinations about what types of relationships human beings are made for.

Alternatively, one could raise expectations of the types of relationships human beings are made for – to remind individuals that human nature is made for virtuous friendship, where persons love one another for God’s sake, for the other’s good, rather than one’s own utility or pleasure. Such an approach may indeed elevate the quality of friendships and deepen genuine belongingness for some. Yet, paradoxically, it may also increase feelings of loneliness among many. A person who once found belonging in friendships of utility or pleasure may, upon recognising that their nature is ordered to something higher, experience a sense of absence or inadequacy in their existing friendships.

This highlights that loneliness and belongingness are not primarily issues to be addressed in themselves but are instead indicators of something that may be happening on an ontological level. When a person’s expectations and perception are aligned with what human nature is designed for, feelings of loneliness may persist – but in this case, it is symptomatic. It highlights a more fundamental problem: the disjunction between the relationships a person has and the relationships they were made for.

Primacy of spiritual friendship. A final implication concerns the centrality of friendship with God. As noted above, every virtuous friendship presupposes a shared orientation toward the divine good. Such friendship, therefore, requires that a person first enter into a spiritual relationship with God – a participation in divine charity by which one can will the true good of another, rather than merely the apparent goods of utility or pleasure. Consequently, the highest form of friendship, and thus the fullest realisation of relational goods that diminish loneliness and foster belongingness, is possible only within a society ordered toward God. Only where individuals are first united to God in charity can they act virtuously toward one another and sustain friendships that reflect the ultimate good.

            Yet, recognising this also reframes loneliness itself. A person who knows that true friendship finds its source in God, yet has not entered that divine friendship, may experience profound loneliness – but such loneliness should not be seen as a defect of a person’s nature, but instead seen as pointing to the inherent spiritual hunger of our human nature. Conversely, a person who participates in friendship with God may know peace even amid a lack of human friendships, for they may perceive that every absent friendship is ordained within Divine providence, and that all things work together for good for those who love God. Thus, loneliness itself can be seen as a motivating factor that draws a person towards spiritual friendship with God – the primary friendship that orders all others and brings peace even in situations that would ordinarily constitute social isolation.

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[i] Summa theologiae (henceforth ST) I-II q.35 a.1 s.c.

[ii] ST I-II q.23 a.1 co.

[iii] ST I-II q.22 a.2 co.

[iv] ST I-II q.23 a.1 co.

[v] ST I-II q.35 a.1 co.

[vi] ST I-II q.35 a.2 co.

[vii] ST I-II q.35 a.2 co.

[viii] ST I-II q.35 a.2 a.d.2.

[ix] ST I-II q.35 a.2 co.

[x] Aquinas distinguishes between “true species”, where some descriptor is added that belongs to the genus itself, and what might be called an “untrue species”, where some descriptor is added that is foreign to the genus. For instance, the addition of “rational” to “animal” yields a true species, since “animal” encompasses both irrational and rational animals, where the addition of “white” to “animal” is an addition of something foreign to the genus “animal”, and so the phrase “white animal” does not designate a new species of animal. There are, however, analogous cases where something can be said to be a part of a genus even if they have an additional foreign feature. For example, burning coal and flames may be identified under species of fire, even though one is a solid and the other gaseous. It is in this first and proper sense that loneliness should be understood as a true species of sorrow, for sorrow is an affective response to a perceived evil to which a person is conjoined, while loneliness is sorrow where there is a particular subset of perceived evils to which a person is conjoined, specifically, a lack of relational goods. Thus, sorrow, in Thomistic terms, might also be called relational sorrow, with “relational” being the differentia of the genus “sorrow”. See ST I-II q.35 a.8 co.

[xi] Louise C. Hawkley and John T. Cacioppo, ‘Loneliness Matters: A Theoretical and Empirical Review of Consequences and Mechanisms’, Annals of Behavioral Medicine 40, no. 2 (2010): 218.

[xii] Andrea Poscia et al., ‘Interventions Targeting Loneliness and Social Isolation among the Older People: An Update Systematic Review’, Experimental Gerontology 102 (February 2018): 133–44.

[xiii] Note that since loneliness is a perception, that a person’s conceptualisation of there conjunction with relational goods may not, in fact, reflect the reality of the situation.

[xiv] Saga Pardede and Velibor Bobo Kovač, ‘Distinguishing the Need to Belong and Sense of Belongingness: The Relation between Need to Belong and Personal Appraisals under Two Different Belongingness–Conditions’, European Journal of Investigation in Health, Psychology and Education 13, no. 2 (2023): 332.

[xv] Alyson L. Mahar et al., ‘Conceptualizing Belonging’, Disability and Rehabilitation 35, no. 12 (2013): 1026.

[xvi] Kelly-Ann Allen et al., ‘Belonging: A Review of Conceptual Issues, an Integrative Framework, and Directions for Future Research’, Australian Journal of Psychology 73, no. 1 (2021): 88.

[xvii] ST I-II q.35 a.4 co.

[xviii] See Summa Theologiae I q. 48, a. 5, a.d.1; a. 3, a.d.2.

[xix] ST I q.48 a.5 co.

[xx] ST I q.48 a.5 co.

[xxi] ST I-II q.35 a.8 co.

[xxii] ST I-II q.35 a.8 co.

[xxiii] ST I-II q.35 a.8 co.

[xxiv] ST II-II q.20 a.4 co.

[xxv] ST I-II q.37 a.2 co.

[xxvi] ST I-II q.31 a.3 co.

[xxvii] ST I-II q.31 a.3 co.

[xxviii] ST I-II q.33 a.1 co.

[xxix] ST I-II q.31 a.3 co.

[xxx] ST I-II q.31 a.3 a.d.3; Super ad Romanos c.2 l.2 n.982; Super I ad Corinthios c.9 l.1 n.332.

[xxxi] ST I-II q.33 a.4 co.

[xxxii] ST II-II q.23 a.1 co.

[xxxiii] ST I-II 1.26 a.4 a.d.3

[xxxiv] Sententia Libri Ethicorum (henceforth Super Nic. ethic), Bk.8 l.3 n.1566.

[xxxv] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.4 n.1595.

[xxxvi] ST II-II q.23 a.1 co.

[xxxvii] ST I-II q.28 a.2 co.

[xxxviii] ST I-II q.28 a.2 co.

[xxxix] Summa contra Gentiles (henceforth ScG) 3.134.3

[xl] ScG 4.21.5

[xli] ScG 4.21.7

[xlii] ScG 4.21.10

[xliii] ScG 4.22.3

[xliv] ScG 4.22.3

[xlv] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1702.

[xlvi] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.9 n.1661.

[xlvii] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1703.

[xlviii] ST II-II q.26 a.8 co.

[xlix] ST II-II q.26 a.8 s.c.

[l] ST II-II q.26 a.8 co.

[li] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1719.

[lii] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1720.

[liii] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1721.

[liv] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1723.

[lv] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1706;1711.

[lvi] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1711.

[lvii] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1715.

[lviii] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1716.

[lix] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.7 n.1629.

[lx] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1712.

[lxi] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1713.

[lxii] Following Aristotle, Aquinas observes that this arises from the duration of their love, their more perfect likeness – since they share the same natural dispositions from their parents and were raised together – and from the stability of a friendship that has endured through the years of shared upbringing. See Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1717.

[lxiii] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1713.

[lxiv] See n.62.

[lxv] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1717.

[lxvi] Aquinas, following Aristotle, nots that it is more offensive for a person to rob, steal, or reject helping their family or a comrade than another citizen because the closeness of those relationships to the person. See Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.9 n.1663.

[lxvii] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1704.

[lxviii] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1704.

[lxix] For Aquinas, the reason why laws are enacted and are followed by its citizens is for the common benefit of the community, that is, their happiness. See ST I-IIq.90 a.2 co.

[lxx] ST II-II q.23 a.1 a.d.1.

[lxxi] Super Nic. ethic, Bk.8 l.12 n.1716.

[lxxii] Scriptum super libros Sententiarum III d.27 q.2 a.2 a.d.4.

[lxxiii] ST II-II q.24 a.2 co.

[lxxiv] ST I-II q.65 a.5 co.

[lxxv] ST II-II q.23 a.1 a.d.1.

[lxxvi] ST II-II q.26 a.1 co.